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Language: Functionalism versus Authenticity 
 





This paper sets out to demonstrate that a phenomenological reflection on language highlights the 
possibilities of authenticity in communication, and as such provides a very necessary complement 
to the dominant linguistic perspectives: the syntactic and grammatical perspective, Saussurean 
linguistics, and systemic functional linguistics. While the syntactic and grammatical perspective, 
which predominates in the educational context, presents language as an institutionalized, 
authoritarian and self-contained system, Saussurean linguistics provides a view of language as a 
complex, self-contained, technical system, as such reflecting the nature of modern society. The 
third perspective, systemic functional linguistics, describes templates of specific genre, models 
which aid students to construct their own, while simultaneously discouraging individual self-
expression. In contrast, a reflective phenomenological perspective identifies and encourages 
authentic self-expression. The paper concludes by considering ways to reconcile the impetus in 
language teaching towards, on the one hand, the language of institutional authority, and, on the 







Language is a ball in which all is contained 
… . Language is a mirror reflecting 
humans as homo sapiens, homo socius, 
homo faber, homo ludens, homo 
symbolicus, homo viator, homo religiosus, 
and homo loquens. By providing a 
linguistic reflection, the language-mirror 
makes us exist. … Language is a curtain 
hiding a secret … . As a window, language 
provides a frame in which the view of the 
world is captured … [it] provides a view 
into our own consciousness and 
subconsciousness and enables a dialogue 
with the “Other”. 
                                                (Terminska, 2001) 
                           
 
  
[For the Dogon, of Mali, Africa] speech is 
… the seed that sows social relationships, 
the hoe that impregnates the earth, the food 
that perpetuates life, the web of cloth that 
clothes man in the spoken word. All words 
across the world form what might be called 
an immense woven web that binds all 
generations together. 
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All over the world today, people are increasingly 
mobile as they travel, migrate to and work in other 
countries, in doing so encountering unfamiliar 
languages and cultures. It is also a world where 
English has increasingly gained currency as an 
international language. Thus, the issue of a language, 
such as English, being both a worldview and a code 
of conduct has come to be a significant part of 
everyday experience. 
 
In this paper, I place the dominant linguistic 
approaches - the classroom grammatical one, 
Saussurean linguistics and systemic functional 
linguistics  -  into a wider perspective. Despite the 
apparent compatibility of the latter approaches with 
the ethos and demands of contemporary society, the 
views of language propagated by Saussure and 
systemic functional linguists do not, however, always 
help us to relate the languages we learn and speak to 
our own experiences or to the experiences of people 
of significance to us. Unfortunately, with the lines of 
academic territoriality drawn in the sand, the 
discipline of linguistics excludes consideration of 
philosophical anthropological issues of relevance in 
dealing with real people with real issues. Also 
countering a linguistic emphasis on the human 
element in language use is the fact that the socio-
economic environment surrounding English language 
teaching and learning has changed from a broadly 
humanistic one to one dictated by more competitive 
market forces. Within this broad context, the 
phenomenological understandings of language 
articulated by Merleau-Ponty are reviewed, and 
arguments are presented that phenomenology assists 
us to formulate understandings of language which are 
highly significant to our daily experiences of 
institutions and language. What will become evident 
is that the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty 
elucidates the nature of expression, and transcends 
cultural, social and linguistic boundaries. 
 
Further insights may be gained from reflecting upon a 
metaphoric view of language, as expounded by the 
Dogon people in Mali, Africa  -  the most multilingual 
continent in the world. The anthropologist, Calame-
Griaule, documented the Dogon’s notion of language, 
applying a phenomenological methodology in her 
research to help the Dogon to express their own 
understandings. For them, a conversation is said to be 
a shared meal, which reflects their view of language 
as sustaining their own close-knit community. This 
contrasts sharply with the situation in contemporary 
Western countries, where one language rules the state, 
and where English is a cosmopolitan and utilitarian 
language. 
Our everyday concerns with gaining both an 
education and vocational training, with finding 
suitable employment and surviving the “system”, 
might lead us to believe that institutions have a 
universality, an authority and permanence which in 
fact they do not have. The language associated with 
institutions has an authority, prestige and apparent 
logic that gives it a high status within its own 
territory. But expressive speech has an authenticity 
and appeal which pervades the intersubjective lives of 
its authors and participants. The existential value of 
expressive speech may override the significance of 
language as an institution. Our own expressive 
utterances are more directly relevant to our own lives 
as we experience them.  
 
In institutional contexts, in contrast, we might say and 
write only that which is to our own advantage, or 
which is socially appropriate, rather than saying what 
we really think or feel. Though institutions might rule 
the nine-to-five day, underneath are our subjective 
lives, which override the restricted timetables under 
which institutions operate while, under the veneer of 
rationality and institutional logic, the human passions 
of its personnel persist.  
 
Various notions of language underpin our 
understandings of the world around us, the societies 
in which we live, and our own human nature. It must 
be remembered that a standardized national language  
-  itself an institution  -  has greater authority than the 
dialects or other languages spoken within that nation. 
Uppermost in our memory is the childhood classroom 
notion of language with which we were brought up, 
one which stipulates correctness of grammar and the 
appropriacy of lexis. The classroom experience is, of 
course, a sheltered experience, quite different from 
the reality of having to learn a new language on the 
streets of a new and strange country. The schooldays’ 
notion may correlate to a legalistic view, whereby the 
dialect of one social class - in our case, the Queen’s 
English - has an unquestionable authority, and is itself 
a revered institution. As our horizons expand, 
however, we find that the predominance of English is 
challenged by the existence of thousands of other 
languages in the world.  
 
But language extends far beyond this childhood 
grammatical view, for language is also the lens 
through which we view and understand our world. 
The Polish linguist, Terminska, quoted above, 
comments on language’s all-pervasive nature, such 
that it cannot be reduced simply to a system, as there 
is no strict borderline between expression and 
language. Her poetic similes give us an insight into 
language not provided by empirical descriptions. 
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Reflections on the nature of language help us to 
appreciate the nature of our experience. Saussure, 
drawing on Descartes’s views that individuals should 
think and work out issues rationally, saw language as 
a complex technical system, one which reflected the 
operations and human motivations of an industrial 
and commercial society. Later, the systemic 
functional linguistics of Halliday and others showed 
that spoken and written acts are inextricably bound up 
with action, and that tasks could be generically 
classified, each task and text being characterized by a 
certain form in its layout and its structural and 
grammatical features. For example, a formal letter of 
complaint - such as to a retailer about purchases 
which turn out to be faulty - has the layout and 
perfunctory characteristics common to all formal 
letters of complaint: presenting the facts of the case 
and requesting compensatory action from the retailer. 
The writer, therefore, must adhere to a strict code of 
conduct. Thus, systemic linguistics assists us to 
produce effective texts for school and work in an 
efficient manner by specifying the characteristics of 
all texts belonging to the same genre. In education, 
systemic functional linguistics has assisted students to 
recognize the typical structure and layout of, say, an 
argumentative essay, and to produce such a text.  
 
To be effective, however, linguistic expression does 
not necessarily have to conform to all these rules and 
guidelines. For instance, I have listened to a Sudanese 
refugee telling his story - outside of school - in a 
brilliant way. This man’s oral expressive mode 
engendered a rich, authentic and spontaneous style of 
delivery. The power and intensity of his dramatic 
narrative carried his delivery forward, so that 
syntactic and lexical errors were rendered 
insignificant. His limited English was, in fact, part of 
his story, adding an appealing dimension.   
 
Likewise, the curricular specification (based on 
functional linguistics) of giving the pros and cons in 
an argumentative text excludes a more passionate 
expression of and response to, for example, the topic 
“It is better to be single than to be married”. Critics of 
systemic linguistics would say that an emphasis on 
the shape and form of a text detracts from the inherent 
content and message of a text, and restricts the 
opportunities for an individual to express himself in 
his own unique way. Furthermore, the emphasis is on 
producing structurally orthodox texts, rather than on 
critical thinking or authentic self-expression. 
 
The English language, as currently treated in 
educational institutions, appears to have been 
increasingly subject to commodification and 
associated with functional activities, being bound up 
with an Anglo-Saxon commercial, legal and political 
world. The pragmatic and commercial value of 
English as a world language is highly regarded. A 
neo-Marxist educational rationale (see, for example, 
Luke, 1996) holds that competency in language and 
literacy is cultural capital, and both promotes access 
to institutions and heightens the institutional power of 
the individual. However, it must be remembered that 
an institution’s sphere of influence - or an individual 
language’s territory - is limited, while consciousness, 
thought and expression themselves are primordial.  
 
A linguistic system or institution is usually viewed as 
being static, and thus standing outside of time, despite 
the plethora of local and individual variations of 
linguistic expression reflected in people’s movements 
around the world as tourists or employees, as 
migrants or refugees. The world is, furthermore, 
viewed as divided between two spheres  -  the English 
speaking world and the perhaps less fortunate “non-
English speaking world”. Despite the fact that 
embodied expression, as an effective means of 
communication between the two “worlds”, evokes 
universal understanding and appreciation, however, 
the linguistic approach classifies gestures, for 
example, as non-verbal and rejects the notion of the 
body as an expressive space, with speaking played out 
instead in the disembodied non-place of linguistics. 
 
Our formal education seems to teach us that what we 
utter is not our creation, nor an expression of our 
thought, but is instead imposed on us by larger forces. 
Furthermore, the language associated with our 
institutionalized childhood education may seem to be 
the vehicle of a standardized, cognitively biased view 
of our English and the English speaking world, 
determining what is right and wrong, especially as 
English seems to rule our multilingual world. 
However, there are now many varieties of English, 
such as Indian Englishes, and there are many speakers 
of other languages (unfamiliar to us) who need to 
express themselves to English speakers, even with 
their rudimentary knowledge of English, and to whom 
we must respond. When we ourselves are in 
unfamiliar linguistic territory in a foreign 
environment, we also grope for words with which to 
express ourselves, and resort to gestures to 
communicate. 
 
Our upbringing occurred under the shadow of a 
universal law “based on the rights and responsibilities 
of an individual” (Logan, 1986, p. 145), accompanied 
by the propagation of an alphabetic system of writing 
(associated with English as a “universal” language) 
and the consequent elevation of the written text, 
which has been given superiority over the act of 
speaking. This upbringing encourages us to forget the 
perceptual and experiential ground of expression, and 
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to think of linguistic expression as simply playing a 
social role and carrying out the functions expected of 
us. Of course, for practical purposes, a language must 
be a “closed” system for the sake of stability (which 
makes it an identifiable language) (Koukal, 2000, p. 
603), but historically there is no such phenomenon as 
a closed system or a pure language, and this is 
particularly so in the contemporary world where 
borders, though carefully policed, are breaking down. 
The fragmentation of international and linguistic 
borders is increasingly accompanied by the 
imposition of universal epistemologies and language 
based on law, commercialism and rationalism.  
 
Contemporary trends in education and linguistics 
accentuate even further the commodification and 
commercialization of language. We know that 
Western epistemologies, typical of public life, are 
founded on the notion that there is a universal, 
rational core of reality, accessed through thinking. 
Language reflects this rational core of reality. 
According to Cook (1982), this notion implied that, 
since there was only one “reason”, a universal and 
necessary set of truths, only René Descartes’s lingua 
universalis could presumably express these truths. 
But if there were many languages, there were also 
many truths (Cook, 1982, p. 532), many worldviews. 
 
The culture instilled by education provides 
individuals with a common body of thought 
categories which, in a very pragmatic way, makes 
communication possible. The state-funded, secular 
and monolingual education systems of modern states 
have to provide for a mass population, which includes 
people from diverse indigenous and ethnic linguistic/ 
epistemological backgrounds, as well as various 
communities that have distinct varieties of linguistic, 
religious and social outlooks. A prime example is the 
former Soviet education system, which was meant to 
serve many ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. 
Pragmatically, a secular, rationalist and cognitivist 
education has the widest applicability, but there is 
nevertheless little possibility of including the 
epistemologies of small communities, let alone the 
perspectives of individual students. It is enough for 
schools to inculcate “democratic values” and 
cognitive skills, the formal assessment of which 
allows students access to higher institutions. 
Furthermore, in the area of teaching English as a 
second or foreign language, many students do not 
have a liberal, Western educational background, 
while some refugee adults have had minimal formal 
education. 
 
Market forces are increasingly contributing to the 
commodification of so-called “learning outcomes”. 
The delivery of vocational training in Australia by 
further education institutions is increasingly being 
privatized. Commercialism has also invaded the 
provision of English as a second or foreign language, 
and might reflect the Saussurean view of society and 
language as a factory. Non-English speakers overseas, 
and migrants and refugees in Australia, need 
certification of English language skills in order to 
access vocational training and employment. As a 
result, there is often an urgency to acquire English 
language skills as soon as possible. The haste with 
which learning has to be undertaken, and the pressure 
on institutions to deliver instruction in an efficient 
and productive way, means that functional criteria for 
judging the success of instructional institutions and 
students’ performances in assessment have priority. 
 
Therefore, against this trend, and beyond the sphere 
of education and training, the individual needs to 
embark, as they say, on a journey of self-discovery in 
extra-institutional contexts - a journey in which 
personal experience and dialogue with other 
individuals will assist in developing understandings 
and allow for individual self expression, and as such 
enable the individual to face up to existential issues 
and gain an appreciation of his own uniqueness and 
self-worth. After all, we can detect when our 
utterances are, in reality, the voices of others, not our 
own, and are not born of our own experiences and 
understandings. Kurt Lewin explains that “what exists 
as ‘reality’ for the individual is, to a high degree, 
determined by what is socially accepted as reality” 
(Lewin, 1967, p. 57). In all societies “each new 
generation is taught how it must understand. ... such 
teaching is the crux of socialization” (Wolf, 1984, p. 
191). In addition, such epistemologies are shaped by 
the vehicle of language. In Whorf’s words, “thinking 
also follows a network of tracks laid down in the 
given language, an organization that may concentrate 
systematically upon certain phrases of reality, certain 
aspects of intelligence, and may systematically 
discard those featured by other languages” (Whorf, 
1956, p. 256). Derrida may have said that “all 
societies capable of producing, that is to say of 
obliterating, their proper names, and of bringing 
classificatory difference into play, practise writing in 
general” (Derrida, 1994, p. 135). Yet, for Derrida, 
meaning is always primarily linguistic in nature, for 
there is “nothing outside the text” (Derrida, 1994, p. 
158). However, the understandings of the Dogon, 
quoted above, and the phenomenologists, assert the 





Descartes proposed the primacy of the cognitive 
function, viewed as entirely independent of the body: 
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[W]hile I decided thus to think everything 
was false, it followed necessarily that I 
who thought thus must be something; and 
observing that this truth: I think, therefore I 
am [cogito ergo sum], was so certain and 
so evident that all the most extravagant 
suppositions of the sceptics were not 
capable of shaking it, I judged that I could 
accept it without scruple as the first 
principle of the philosophy I was seeking. 
(Descartes, 1637/1968, pp. 53-54) 
 
A person, as envisaged by Descartes, inhabited a 
body, a machine, but one “incomparably better 
ordered” (Descartes, 1637/1968, p. 73) than the 
bodies of animals, one that can use words and signs, 
but is nevertheless still a machine. Thus, Descartes 
distinguished between mind and matter, between 
religion and science, and it was matter which was to 
be investigated by science. Mind and matter had no 
way of interacting, and hence a satisfying account of 
the interaction of cognition and perception could not 
be established, as “mind and matter seem incomplete 
apart but incomprehensible together” (Fox, 1980, p. 
359). This distinction and quandary has carried over 
to linguistics and the social sciences. 
 
It followed, for Descartes, that the only reliable 
principle of investigation for this person who thinks is 
the discipline of mathematics, because only 
“mathematicians have been able to arrive at any 
proofs, that is to say, certain and evident reasons” 
(Descartes, 1637/1968, p. 42). Descartes accordingly 
decided to borrow “all the best from geometric 
analysis and from algebra” in order to carry out his 
project (Descartes, 1637/1968, p. 42). His method 
was a rejection of “dialectical thought as a means of 
reasoning from reputable opinions to conclusions, of 
the use of metaphor and other rhetorical devices, and 
of the claims of history and historical narratives to 
knowledge” (Gare, 2002, p. 83). Descartes located the 
soul in the pineal gland, so reducing the body to an 
“object without a subject, a thing to be mastered by 
‘objective’ science” (Devisch, 1985, p. 394). 
Descartes thought that he would borrow all the best 
from geometrical analysis and from algebra, and 
would correct all the defects of the one by means of 
the other, to help him determine the nature of the 
person (Descartes, 1637/1968, p. 41).  
 
In a similar spirit, and in order to overcome “tribal” or 
perceptually oriented approaches to speaking, for 
Saussure the linguistic focus became scientific, and la 
langue - rule based language - took precedence over 
la parole, the actual experience of speaking, which, 
because of its unpredictability, fell outside the realm 
of science. Linguists who study langue “study 
something that is by definition superindividual ... a 
‘shared’ system, that is a system that is of interest 
only insofar as it can be treated as identical from 
individual to individual” (Johnstone, 2000, p. 408).  
 
Saussurean linguistics is a science which does not 
accommodate the uniqueness of the speaking subject, 
on the basis that a scientist must meet the need for a 
“nonreducible structure consisting of universal, 
constant and complete laws through which he may 
account for all linguistic phenomena” (de Saussure, 
1959, p. 3). Saussure sought a “static and systematic 
structure through which to examine linguistic 
phenomena” (Koukal, 2000, p. 601). He established a 
science of language by “avoiding situational 
contingency for the sake of structural form ... . This 
decision eliminates the speaking subject” (Hohler, 
1982, p. 292).  
 
Structuralists took up Saussure’s innovative focus on 
la langue, the language of the speech community of 
individuals, and gave it priority over that of the study 
of la parole, the individual and interpersonal speaking 
action. So, for structuralists, as explained by Lanigan 
(1992, p. 69), language has priority over speech, 
simply because speech may be too chaotic for 
scientific study. However, la langue covers over and 
hides the “living relationships expressed in la parole” 
(Berman, 2004, p. 139). This, according to Schrag 
(1986, p. 124), leaves us with an abstracted notion in 
which there is no place for the question “Who is 
speaking?” In other words, the process of working 
through a philosophical anthropology is outside the 
realm of linguistics.  
 
In similar vein, for Levi-Strauss, language “must 
precede thought and be independent of it” (Warnick, 
1979, p. 251), thus inferring that we are the “dupes of 
the abstract system of language which is working 
within us by its own rules” (Pettit, 1972; as cited in 
Warnick, 1979, p. 251). Such a view minimizes a 
human being’s individuality and ability to make 
moral choices based on intuition and life experience. 
Furthermore, Levi-Strauss minimizes the influence of 
the individual and history on social action, as “history 
is subordinated to the system” (Levi-Strauss, 1962/ 
1972, p. 233). 
 
Not surprisingly, Saussure uses a capitalist analogy, 
equating the relationship of signifiers and signified to 
the relationship between currency and goods (de 
Saussure, 1959, p. 115). Wang (1995) provides 
cogent arguments that Derrida himself draws on 
Saussure to create his key concept of the “self-
referential text” which parallels the “autonomy of the 
market under late capitalism” (Wang, 1995, p. 261). 
Saussure showed that the “bond between signifier 
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(acoustic sound) and signified (image of the referent) 
is arbitrary” (Wang, 1995, p. 278), so that Saussure’s 
linguistics bears a very close resemblance to market 
mechanisms. In the market place, Marx (1867/1959) 
explained, the price of a product is not always related 
to its inherent value. Thus it can be demonstrated that 
the “value of each commodity is not determined with 
reference to human needs but with reference to other 
commodities” (Wang, 1995, p. 278). For Wang, 
commodity production and exchange is liberated from 
human needs as a reference point, so that limits are 
removed to the extent to which the human body can 
be manipulated to maximize consumption and profit. 
 
Systemic Functional Linguistics 
 
Historically, there was a move against Descartes’s 
rejection of the body and perception, so that 
functional linguistics recognized, perhaps not the 
body, but definitely human activity. In the twentieth 
century, both functional linguists and Soviet 
psychologists such as Rubinstein and Vygotsky 
elevated the role of activity, a move which pleased 
the Marxists with their emphasis on labour 
(Brushlinskii, 2004, p. 71). Instead of Descartes’s “I 
think”, there emerged a “new cogito of intentionality 
or lived experience in which one recognizes the ‘I am 
able to’, ‘I can’ ...” (Lanigan, 1988, p. 46). Searle 
developed the speech act theory, the aim of which 
was to locate and describe the basic types of 
illocutions in a systematic taxonomy (Searle, 1979). 
Within the tradition of British analytical philosophy, 
Austin’s cognitivist notion of “performative 
utterances” or “operative utterances” (Austin, 1961, p. 
223) emphasizes the fact that a person does 
something as well as simply saying something. Austin 
distinguishes between locutionary acts and 
illocutionary acts, the former being the utterance of 
utterances, the latter being the acts we perform in 
uttering some utterances (Harris, 1976, p. 389). 
Austin explains that “the more we consider a 
statement not as a sentence (or proposition) but as an 
act of speech ... the more we are studying the whole 
thing as an act” (Austin, 1961, p. 20). To make 
certain utterances is to “perform the action - an 
action, perhaps, which one could scarcely perform, at 
least with so much precision, in any other way” 
(Austin, 1961, p. 147). The act of doing something is 
inseparable from the act of saying something. Thus, 
for Austin, the linguistic behaviour of a person is 
more significant than any formal structures of 
language.  
 
Systemic functional linguistics uses a technical and 
extensive meta-language to describe the functions and 
metafunctions of language. Language is a tool, as 
linguistic communication is behavioural, and symbols 
elicit behavioural responses. Conversation is a 
transaction and a negotiation. Language as a tool is 
represented by Vygotsky’s activity theory and 
Halliday’s systemic linguistics. For Vygotsky, 
however, a tool is not a simple hand-held hammer or 
paintbrush, but a modern, technologically complex 
tool. Functional linguistics adds a sociological 
dimension to scientific linguistics, as it emphasizes 
the instrumental character of language and stresses 
that language is not a self-sufficient entity (Davidse, 
1987, p. 40). It accordingly focuses on the speaker’s 
strategy and purpose “rather than on the process by 
which speaker and audience share meanings and 
develop possibilities for common experience” 
(Warnick, 1979, p. 250).  
 
In an effort to be a system, like Saussure’s scientific 
language, systemic functional linguistics excludes 
contingent speech and the person who is speaking. 
Although it rescues language from the state of being a 
pure science and relates language to everyday use by 
having recourse to sociological theory, functional 
linguistics, like the natural sciences, seeks to compile 
taxonomies of language use rather than to explicate 
the experience of speaking and interacting. Rather 
than pertaining to a community of individuals of 
various ages and personalities, its sociology is 
impersonal, universal and standardized. 
 
In this way, Halliday’s systemic linguistics tries to 
describe “the linguistic differences associated, not 
with different communities of speakers, but with 
different activities in social life” (Lemke, 1995, p. 
26), so that “our uses of language are inseparable 
from the social functions, the social contexts of 
actions and relationships in which language plays its 
part” (Lemke, 1995, p. 27). According to Halliday 
and Matthiessen (1999), in a systemic grammar every 
category “is based on meaning, rather than being a 
formal grammar which is autonomous and therefore 
‘semantically arbitrary’” (pp. 3-4). It regards 
cognition as a “social semiotic rather than as a system 
of the human mind” (Kilpert, 2003, p. 166), and so 
puts less emphasis on the individual. Rather, it sees 
meaning more as a social process and has, in other 
words, a sociocognitive approach to language 
(Atkinson, 2002, p. 525).  
 
Despite its pragmatic uses, functional linguistics  -  
which, after all, is only one of many views of 
language - excludes bodily self-expression and 
consciousness, and is also based on the monetary/ 
goods exchange model of capitalism, whereby 
information is exchanged and tasks are performed 
without regard for their inherent value or meaning. 
Thus, the commonality of functional linguistics with 
the Saussurean text as commodity is exposed. 
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The mid-twentieth century, marked by the advent of 
poststructuralism, saw the “linguistic turn” by which 
existential problems came to be regarded as linguistic 
ones, problems about language, with the person 
perceived as constituted by larger forces such as 
society and language as an institution. This was part 
of a broader movement in the human sciences in 
which language constituted reality, and so the focus 
 
shifted away from the study of man as a 
subject of experience, as the cogito in 
whom and for whom the world is 
constituted as meaningful, toward the 
objective structures of thought (and 
language). ... the focus is shifted away 
from the ‘heroic’ vision of man as the 
source and creator of his own history and 
of his social institutions to the supposedly 
infrahuman and ‘automatic’ rules 
governing his behaviour. (Edie, 1971, p. 
307) 
 
Phenomenology, in contrast, upholds both the 
uniqueness and the commonality of embodied human 
expression  -  whereby we all have more or less the 
same sort of body and perceptual processes, but each 
of us has a uniquely individual quality of conscious 
life, shaped by our unique socio-temporal 
situatedness. Phenomenology asserts the primacy of 
speaking over the static and institutionalized character 
of written texts. Speaking is associated with 
consciousness and subjectivity, and is subjected to the 
“non-repeatable, uncontrollable irruptions of free 
choice” (Edie, 1971, p. 307). Merleau-Ponty, in The 
Prose of the World, sought to understand the unity of 
la langue and la parole, of rule and practice, of 
objective analysis and lived experience. He sought to 
abandon  
 
the abstract universality of a rational 
grammar which could contain the common 
essence of all languages, [so that] we 
would only rediscover the concrete 
universality of language, which can be 
different from itself without openly 
denying itself. (Merleau-Ponty, 1969/ 
1973a, pp. 39-40) 
 
In other words, embodied expression transcends 
linguistic and cultural barriers. Merleau-Ponty, in 
Signs, integrates Saussure’s hypothesis regarding the 
functional nature of signs with a phenomenological 
perspective. He “set in motion a dialectic through 
which the two disciplines [the objective science of 
language and the phenomenology of speech] open 
communication” (Merleau-Ponty, 1960/1964b, p. 86). 
Nevertheless, speaking, for all of us, seeks to break 
out of the limiting circumstances of a sedimented 
language that tends to “consolidate, formalize and 
regulate established meaning” (Koukal, 2000, p. 602). 
After all, human behaviour and speech can become 
habitualized and institutionalized, and so inhibit 
authentic expression. Speech, unlike a written text, 
“says, reveals, and shares” (Hohler, 1982, p. 290). 
According to Merleau-Ponty in Sense and Non-Sense, 
language must nevertheless “remain open to the 
initiatives of the subject ... always [be] capable of the 
displacement of meanings, the ambiguities, and the 
functional substitutions which give this logic its 
lurching gait” (Merleau-Ponty, 1948/1964a, p. 87).  
 
In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty reminds us 
that our utterances are unselfconscious, poetic and 
individualistic. “One does not know what one is 
saying, one knows only after one has said it” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1969/1973a, p. 46, footnote). Being 
is not a static form of life but a “dynamic becoming” 
(Keller, 2005, p. 178), just as language and meaning 
are neither static nor determinate. Our utterances, in 
fact, arise from thought and experience, rather than 
from an abstract linguistic system or from a society 
which speaks through us. The words we speak can be 
poetic: we as embodied beings express ourselves in 
unique and unrepeatable ways, our bodies moulding 
sounds into words, utterances which express an 
affective tone reflecting our spatio-temporal 
situatedness  -  being older or younger, a foreigner or 
a local. Our utterances translate desires into words, 
and perceptual meaning into symbolic expression in 
linguistic form. 
 
Ethics characterizes such a phenomenological 
approach, whereas law as a system supports the 
notion of language as a functional system, where 
everyone is “just doing their job.” Spoken interaction 
(unlike reading a book) is necessarily interpersonal, 
and, as human beings, our gestures and affectivity, 
like our utterances, are moulded by the participants. 
Hence interactions are ethical - but in terms of an 
ethics which is affectively toned and lacking in a 
binary distinction of right and wrong. In contrast, 
linguistics would talk about the “social rules of 
conversation”, while logical positivist bases of law 
and scientific linguistics would deny the “cognitive 
meaningfulness of ethical, aesthetic and religious 
discourse” (Weinzweig, 1977, p. 117).  
 
Thus, self-expression’s ethical implication is self-
responsibility and answerability to the community: it 
is in relation to the community that I find the 
affirmation that “I am”, in contrast to my more 
impersonal membership of a state, which “reshapes[s] 
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individuals to meet its needs” (Hart, 1992, p. 397). 
Hart explains that it is only in the community that the 
individual can meet the “reality of cooperation, 
indebtedness, and the chance for gratitude and 
gracious initiative” (Hart, 1992, p. 397). Self-
expression, both ethical and aesthetic, forges 
individual identity. For Husserl, the basis of personal 
identity is one’s ethical life, as to a certain degree a 
person is responsible for the unity and identity of his 
personal being.  
 
Identity is found in a person’s embodied aesthetic 
expression, by the performance of which some of us 
might be attracted, some repelled. Merleau-Ponty 
compares a person’s highly individualized gestural 
expression to a melody, an “intentional arc”, which 
brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of 
sensibility and motility (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, 
p. 136). The Dogon of Mali, for example, see words 
as being produced inside the body, so that each organ, 
with its different characteristics, makes different 
contributions to the kind and quality of words as well 
as tones and intonations. For the Dogon,  
 
[G]estures are important to speech because 
they increase its quantity of oil. Words on 
their own have a water base. Gestures 
lubricate them, make them “flow” better, 
easier to understand ... . Certain gestures 
are meant to help words come out when 
they have difficulty expressing themselves. 
(Calame-Griaule, 1965, p. 63)  
 
Merleau-Ponty, in The Phenomenology of Perception, 
describes speech as being a continuity with gesture: 
speech itself is a gesture. A person is not, however, an 
autonomous monad: speakers interacting with others 
take on others’ style of speaking and gesturing; 
comprehension comes about through the “reciprocity 
of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my 
gestures and intentions discernible in the conduct of 
others” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 185). The 
adjective aesthetic, therefore, characterizes not only 
the expression of the eloquent professional artist, but 
also the hesitant gestures and utterances of a 
newcomer whose lexical resources are limited in the 
local language. Aesthetic self-expression is married to 
mimetic behaviour, in which people who are enjoying 
“intersubjective closeness” mirror each other’s bodily 
comportment, so that gesture and speech are 
harmonized in speaking, and synchronized with each 
other.  
 
Western epistemologies may challenge those of other 
cultures, but Husserl, writing in the 1930s, supported 
the inherent worth of epistemologies of other cultures, 
saying that “every people, large or small, has its own 
world in which, for that people, everything fits well 
together, whether in mythical-magical or in 
European-rational terms, and in which everything can 
be explained perfectly” (Husserl, 1936/1970, p. 373). 
Thus the anthropologist, Cordova-Rios, in learning an 
Amazonian language, is able to adopt a sensorial 
approach, rather than a cognitivist one: 
 
… the first stage of acquiring a language is 
a question of opening oneself to the 
elemental feeling of its sonorous field of 
sense, attuning oneself to its underlying 
song, the way that the language sings, and 
listening towards the various affective and 
expressive qualities audible in its 
constituted field of sound. (Cordova-Rios; 
as quoted in Lamb, 1974, p. 28) 
 
I myself, in Thessaloniki, Greece, only began learning 
Greek when I put away the grammar books and 
opened my heart, so to speak, to the local community. 
 
Calame-Griaule, in describing the Dogon of Mali, 
provides a comprehensive account of the aesthetic 
and ethical dimensions of Dogon language, and 
demonstrates in the process that an ordinary person 
anywhere can speak creatively, poetically and 
intuitively. Unlike the dictionary one-to-one 
correspondence of sign and signified, the Dogon 
maintain 
 
… that a “sign” or symbol and that which it 
symbolizes is reversible; that signs, 
substitutes, and images constitute a vast 
system of correspondences, in which every 
term is interlocked within what seem to be 
specific categories. These categories in 
their turn, whether linked or opposed, are 
themselves correlated. (Calame-Griaule, 
1954, p. 83) 
 
Aesthetic self-expression, rather than the formulation 
of linguistic texts, is the expression of being and 
personal identities by interlocutors who mutually 
recognize each other and are mutually responsive. In 
speaking, a person improvises, using the resources of 
language and thought borrowed from both others and 
himself in the past, and thus gains autonomy and 
authenticity (O’Neill, 1970, p. 58), even though he is 
still part of a social institution and the social 
institution is part of him.  
 
Speech reconciles language as a system or institution 
with voice, so that “we are the language we are 
talking about” (O’Neill, 1970, p. 62). We might 
struggle against the imposition of institutional 
servitude, in Hegel’s sense, so that a person’s history 
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is a struggle for emancipation from such servitude. 
For the phenomenologist, it is the degree of 
individuation of an embodied self which  -  although 
involved with other embodied persons - has, 
nevertheless, “a capacity to distinguish itself 
consciously from others and to regard its history and 
prospects as its own” (Wilshire, 1991, p. 226). So 
language can be used to “revolt against such 
membership in a community and identification with 
its traditions” (Hamrick, 1994, p. 405). The unity of 
personal identity gives continuity to a person over the 
vicissitudes of time and space, for “we stand out at 
the centre of our conscious experience” (Sokolowski, 
2000, p. 34), which is found in the “interplay of 
memories, imaginations and perceptions, and in the 
flow of our awareness of interior time” (Sokolowski, 
2000, p. 33). Such a concept of identity persists in the 
midst of the spatio-temporal, linguistic and cultural 
changes that pervade our environments, and in spite 
of the prestige of institutional authority and language. 
 
Authentic speech is identical with thought: “Thought 
and expression, then, are simultaneously constituted” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 183). Thought and 
inner speech are not locked up in a private mind, as 
Merleau-Ponty explains: “Thought is no ‘internal 
thing’, and does not exist independently of the world 
and of words” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 183). 
Or, as Schrag puts it: “The spoken word is not an 
exterior garment that clothes an inner thought. The 
spoken word is the performance of thought” (Schrag, 
1986, p. 44). Thoughts, intuitions and perceptions can 
only gain objective validity in the act of expression in 
language (Koukal, 2001, p. 28), but Husserl provides 
a relevant qualification when he says that a person 
“does not ‘express’ all his psychic life in language: 
nor is he ever able to do so” (Husserl, 1929/1969, p. 
22).  
 
Speaking is always a striving, a seeking out of an 
intersubjective sphere where expression can take 
place, and its authenticity has an intensity. This 
intensity of speaking is manifest through the body, the 
tongue, mouth and throat, the nose; through the 
breath, the gaze, the posture and demeanour. 
Philosophically, gestural speech has reference and 
intentionality (Hohler, 1982, p. 290), unlike a “spoken 
text”. The fabric of intentionality is desire, and 
desires, unlike needs, cannot be fulfilled (Barbaras, 
2003, p. 165): the object of desire frustrates the 
subject, but the individual still needs to express and 
articulate his desires. A complete expression is 
unthinkable, and each person struggles with his 
language “to discover what he thinks” (Kaelin, 1962, 
p. 267). Self-expression may manifest itself in silence 
as well as in utterances, in withdrawal as well as in 
participation. After all, according to Merleau-Ponty, a 
face, even in repose or death, is “always doomed to 
express something” (1945/1962, p. 452). 
 
The ideal of objective thought is both “based upon 
and ruined by temporality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/ 
1962, p. 333). Spatially, we are tied to a horizon, 
which may be historical or cultural, an intersubjective 
(Clarke et al., 1984, p. 51) world which is always 
ahead of us. Schutz (1962, p. 324) pointed out that 
speech, like music and dance, is an intersubjective 
time-process, one which is negotiated between 
participants. A person’s “field of presence” has 
spatial and temporal dimensions, enclosed within 
shifting horizons (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 416). 
The body is an expressive space in which speech and 
gesture are comprehensible by listeners, because they 
embody a “reciprocity of my intentions and the 
gestures of others, of my gestures and intentions 
discernible in the conduct of other people” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 185). My body is perceptually 
intertwined with my surroundings. Casey explains the 
relevance of a physical place: 
 
To be at all - to exist in any way - is to be 
somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be 
in some kind of place. Place is the requisite 
for the air we breathe, the ground on which 
we stand, the bodies we have. (Casey, 
1997, p. ix) 
 
The body’s movements relate a person to his spatio-
temporal situations, and thus is the “basis for the 
unity of the senses” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 
234). But place is also associated with language, and 
one moves from place to place, from one language to 
another language, from a place where one can 
communicate linguistically to another where one 
cannot, from the strictures of institutionalism to the 
sphere of authentic self-expression.  
 
The Dynamic Interplay of Institutional Language 
and Expressive Speaking 
 
Saussure defined parole as the conscious, individual 
act of speaking, the utterance, and langue as a 
systemic code underlying speech, which code is 
“unconscious, impersonal, passive and which the 
individual acquires but cannot change” (Warnick, 
1979, p. 251). Merleau-Ponty stressed the co-
dependency of langue and parole, spoken 
communication being inextricably linked with the 
subjectivity and temporality that is associated with the 
specificity of the experiences of each person. 
 
Expressive speech recognizes the ever-changing 
nature of experience, while institutional language 
seeks permanence and stability. Merleau-Ponty 
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distinguishes between a speaking word [parole 
parlante] and a spoken word [parole parlee]. The 
former, in Adams’s words, refers to that already-
accomplished linguistic deposit of built-up meanings, 
while the latter refers to a not-yet-accomplished 
speech act performing the enactment of a new 
meaning (Adams, 2001, p. 210). Merleau-Ponty 
further reflects in Signs that speech,  
 
as distinguished from language, is that 
moment when the significative intention 
(still silent and wholly in act) proves itself 
capable of incorporating into my culture 
and the culture of others  -  of shaping me 
and others by transforming the meaning of 
cultural instruments. (1960/1964b, p. 92) 
  
For these reasons, one must sometimes, and in some 
spheres, transcend institutional languages, and the 
language of institutions which are so strongly 
associated with formal educational institutions and 
one’s duties to society. A phenomenological 
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